We investigate the Multiplayer Multicommodity Flow Problem (MMFP): several players have dierent networks and commodities over a common node set. Pairs of players have contracts where one of them agrees to route the ow of the other player (up to a given capacity) between two specied nodes. In return, the second player pays an amount proportional to the ow value.
of players; each contract obliges one player to route the ow of the other player between two specied nodes (up to a given capacity). In return, the other player pays an amount proportional to the ow value. We also allow a multiplier applied to the amount of ow to be routed by the second player, which may model e.g. the increase of data size due to conversion between networks.
Multiplayer ows have already been studied in the literature in the context of cooperative games, but the usual setting is to have a single network where each player owns a subset of the arcs, and other players are allowed to buy a fraction of the arc capacity [4, 1] . Our network model is more general in the sense that players can choose how to route demands generated by contracts with other players.
The ow multipliers associated with the contracts add another layer of generalization that is subtle in the sense that the interpretation of feasible solutions in terms of actual transportation of commodities becomes tricky.
We show in Section 2 that such an interpretation is always possible if the ow multipliers are at least 1, using the notion of realization of a path which corresponds naturally to the transportation of a commodity. In contrast, multipliers smaller than 1 may result in feasible solutions that do not have such an interpretation.
In the rest of the current section we give the necessary denitions, including the notion of social optimum, safe instance and equilibrium solution. It is shown in Section 2 that the problem of nding a social optimum can be solved in polynomial time using linear programming, and we give a common sense interpretation of feasible solutions in terms of realizations of paths and acyclic solutions. The aim of Section 3 is to extend the column generation and Lagrangian relaxation methods for multicommodity ows to MMFP. In Section 4, we prove using the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem that an equilibrium solution always exists in a safe instance, while in general it is NP-complete to decide its existence.
Denitions and notation
Given a set of players I, each player has a digraph D i = (V, A i ) (with disjoint arc sets) with costs c : ∪ i∈I A i → R + , capacities u : ∪ i∈I A i → R + , and normal demands: a ow of size d i j has to be sent from s i j to t i j (j ∈ J i ). There is a subset of arcs B i ⊆ A i called contractual arcs, where the player has a contract with another player requiring the other player to route the ow between the two endnodes of the arc in her own network for a specied price (proportional to the amount of ow). The arcs in A i \B i are called normal arcs. Let 
The following additional values are given for each contractual arc a ∈ B i . i a is the player that has to route the ow going through a. f a : [0, u a ] → R + is a continuous monotone increasing function that gives the amount of ow to be routed, i.e. if the ow value of a = uv is x, then player i a has to route a ow of size f a (x) from u to v. This function may model the increase of data size due to the conversion between networks. Usually we will consider the linear case f a (x) = d a x. We always assume that d a ≥ 1 (or, in general f a (x) ≥ x for any x ∈ R + ) holds for every a ∈ B. The resulting demand in the network of i a is called a contractual demand for player i a . The identier of this demand is k a . Let K i be the set of identiers of the contractual demands for player i; then k a ∈ K ia for a ∈ B i . We assume that all the identier sets J i , K i (i ∈ I) are disjoint and let J = ∪ i∈I J i and K = ∪ i∈I K i . Note that a → k a is a bijection between B and K.
A contractual arc a has a contract price, denoted by p a . If the ow value of a = uv is x, then player i has to pay p a x to player i a in exchange for sending the ow.
It may seem confusing at rst that a contractual arc has both a contract price p a and a cost c a . A possible interpretation is that the contract price determines the payment to another player, while the cost of a contractual arc represents the cost of transferring the ow to another network. We do not make any restrictions on the costs, but it is probably a natural assumption that costs of contractual arcs are much lower than costs of normal arcs.
Feasible and equilibrium solutions
In a feasible solution each player has a multicommodity ow (one commodity for every j ∈ J i ∪ K i ) that satises all normal and contractual demands. Note that here the contractual demands depend on the multicommodity ows of the other players.
A social optimum solution is a feasible solution which is optimal for the cost function c. The contract prices play no role in this denition.
Let us motivate the assumption d a ≥ 1 (a ∈ B). Consider the following two-player example where V = {s, t}. Let A 1 = B 1 = {a = st} and A 2 = B 2 = {b = st} (i.e. both players have a contract with the other) and the only normal demand is for player 1 who has to ship 1 unit from s to t (i.e. let J 1 = {j 1 } with these parameters and let J 2 = ∅). Let the capacities be given as u a = 2 and u b = 1 and the multipliers as d a = 1/2 and d b = 1. The following is a feasible solution: the rst player ships 2 units from s to t on arc a which is the sum of two ows x j1 (satisfying the normal demand j 1 ∈ J 1 ) and x k b (satisfying the contractual demand k b to be described later). The ow on arc a induces a contractual demand of value 1 for player 2, since d a = 1/2, which is shipped on arc b, i.e. x ka (b) = 1. This in turn generates a contractual demand of value 1 for player 1 (since d b = 1). Clearly, this is a feasible solution of the problem, although from a practical point of view it does not make sense (for example this solution does not have a physical routing). This example shows that the assumption d a ≥ 1 (or, in general f a (x) ≥ x for any a ∈ B and x ∈ R + ) is indeed natural.
We say that an instance of MMFP is a safe instance if each player i has a feasible solution for the standard multicommodity ow problem in D i (in-cluding the arcs in B i !) for all her normal demands plus all her contractual demands set at their maximum (for a contractual arc a = uv, the maximal contractual demand for player i a is f (u a ) from u to v).
An equilibrium solution is a feasible solution which is a minimum cost multicommodity ow restricted to each player's network for the player's normal and contractual demands induced by the solution. Here the cost of arc a ∈ A i \ B i is c a , while the cost of arc a ∈ B i is c a + p a . It may seem strange that we do not consider the contract prices that a player receives; this is because these received payments depend only on the multicommodity ows of the other players, so they are irrelevant to whether a player's multicommodity ow is minimum cost or not in her own network (they add a constant to the cost if the ows of the other players are xed).
It is important to note that this notion of equilibrium is stronger than the usual Nash-equilibrium, because here players cannot improve their objective even with strategy changes that render the whole solution infeasible.
LP formulation and interpretation 2.1 LP formulation
In case of f a (x) = d a x, there are two main LP models for nding the social optimum: the arc-ow and the path-ow formulations. The rst one can be written as follows.
x j a ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A i , j ∈ J i , ∀i ∈ I, (5) x k a ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A i , k ∈ K i , ∀i ∈ I. (6) Here, N i is the network matrix of the ith player, δ j is a vector with only two non-zero components: −1 at the supply node and 1 at the demand node. Similarly, δ a is a vector with only two non-zero components: −1 at the tail and 1 at the head of the arc a. The variable x j is the ow of commodity j ∈ J i on the arcs of the network of the ith player. The variable x k is the ow of contractual commodity k ∈ K i on the arcs of the network of the ith player.
The path-ow formulation of the problem requires some additional notation. Let P i j denote the set of paths in D i from the source to the sink of the jth commodity of player i. Similarly, P i k denotes the set of paths in D i from the source to the sink of the kth contractual commodity of player i. We also assume that if there is more than one (normal or contractual) demand in D i between s and t for a certain pair s, t ∈ V , then for each demand there is a separate P i
The variable x P , P ∈ P i j (P ∈ P i k ) belongs to the ow of (contractual) commodity j (k) on the path P , and c(P ) = a∈P c a .
The correspondence between the solutions of (2)-(6) and the solutions of (8)-(12) is the following. If x l (l ∈ J ∪ K) is a solution of (2)-(6), then we can take a path-decomposition of every ow x l (leaving out the possible cycles) and get a solution of (8)-(12). On the other hand, if x P (P ∈ P) is a solution of (8)-(12), then x l = P ∈P i l x P for every i ∈ I and l ∈ J i ∪ K i gives a solution of (2)-(6).
Interpretation of feasible solutions
We assume d a ≥ 1 for all contractual arcs a ∈
In this section we consider the path representation of the MMFP, using the notation P, P i , P i j of the previous subsection. Our aim is to formalize the intuitive notion that the commodities corresponding to normal demands are actually transferred to their destination with a nite number of transfers between networks of dierent players.
A feasible solution in the path representation is given by a vector x ∈ R P + that satises the constraints (10)-(12). Intuitively, a solution of this system amounts to a physical routing along paths, in which we satisfy a portion of the jth demand of the ith player by a certain path P 1 ∈ P i j . However, if P 1 contains a contractual arc a, then the corresponding contractual demand is satised by another path P 2 ∈ P ia ka , and so on. P 1 may contain several contractual arcs, thus we may need paths other than P 2 to satisfy contractual Denition 1 Let P ∈ P be arbitrary. We give a recursive denition of a digraph (R, F ) with R ⊆ P: start with R = {P } and F = ∅, and in every step choose a node Q ∈ R that is not a normal path and has out-degree zero in (R, F ). For every contractual arc a ∈ Q choose an (arbitrary) path Q a ∈ P ia ka and add it to R (if it was not already in it) and include the arc QQ a in F , too. Clearly, the construction is nite. Thus the out-degree of any node Q in (R, F ) equals the number of contractual arcs in Q. If (R, F ) is acyclic, then we say that it is a realization of P (a path P might have many dierent realizations).
We are only interested in realization of paths P ∈ P i j for j ∈ J i . The set of realized paths is denoted by R. Let R i j denote the set of realized paths that realize a path in P i j for an i ∈ I, j ∈ J i , and also let R i := ∪ j∈J i R i j for any i ∈ I. If (R, F ) is a realization of P , then let d (R,F ) : R → R + denote the ow values needed to realize the path P at the root, which is dened as follows:
One might think that the above denition is more laborious than necessary: a realized path could simply be an arborescence (R, F ) with R ⊆ P. However, the example in Figure 1 shows that we cannot make this assumption.
To interpret this denition in terms of shipping of commodities, consider a realized path (R, F ) such that P ∈ P is the root in (R, F ). Assume we want to ship one unit of the commodity from the rst node of P to the last node of P . We may do this, of course, via P if it only uses normal arcs, and in this case (R, F ) is a single node. Otherwise P may contain a number of contractual arcs, which may be realized by the children of P in (R, F ). This, by constraint (12), requires the shipping of d a units of the contractual commodity k a by contractor i a . Thus when we encounter a contractual arc a in P ∩ P i j , we satisfy the contractual demand generated by arc a using the unique child Q of P with Q ∈ P ia ka . Note that we need to make |F | such calls in total, since (R, F ) is acyclic.
Given a solution x ∈ R P + of (10)-(12), a realization of x, i.e. a realization of a feasible solution is given by a non-negative vector y ∈ R R + that satises
A solution y of this system means that a realized path (R, F ) is used at throughput y (R,F ) in our realized routing. By the rst constraint we make sure that y comes from a realization of x, and by the second constraint we satisfy all the demands.
In order to demonstrate that the model of MMFP is meaningful, we should show that feasible solutions can be realized with a routing of normal commodities using realization of paths, as dened above. The following Lemma is a formal statement of this claim. Lemma 1 Given a solution x ∈ R P + of (10)-(12), there is a solution y of (13)-(14). Also, given x one can determine a solution y of (13)-(14) in polynomial time.
In order to prove this lemma we dene acyclic solutions.
Acyclic solutions
Denition 2 A feasible solution x of (2)- (6) is an acyclic solution if there is a linear order ≺ on J ∪K such that if l ∈ J ∪K, x l (a) > 0, and a is a contractual arc, then l ≺ k a . Similarly, a feasible solution of (8)-(12) is an acyclic solution if there is a linear order ≺ of supp(x) such that for any P ∈ supp(x) and any contractual arc a ∈ P ∩ B we have P ≺ P for every P ∈ P ia ka ∩ supp(x).
Denition 3 For a feasible solution x of (8)-(12) we dene the following edge-
The nodes in supp(x) have in-degree 1: the only arc entering a path P ∈ supp(x) ∩ P i l comes from node l (where i ∈ I and l ∈ J i ∪ K i ) and this arc has weight x P .
The arcs leaving this path P go to the nodes k a ∈ K for every a ∈ P ∩ B (i.e. the out-degree of P is zero if and only if P is a normal path) and these arcs have weight d a x P . Note that if l ∈ J then l is not the head of any arc, and the digraph D x is bipartite with color classes J ∪ K and supp(x). Observe that x is acyclic if and only if this digraph is acyclic.
Proposition 1 If x is a feasible solution of (8)-(12), then there is an acyclic solution x * such that x * ≤ x.
Proof Suppose indirectly that the nodes P 1 , k a1 , P 2 , k a2 , . . . , P m , k am form a cycle in D x (in this order). Let x := x − m i=1 χ {Pi} with maximum to maintain the non-negativity of x . We claim that x is a feasible solution of (8)-(12). Clearly, (8)-(10) holds for x too, since 0 ≤ x ≤ x. (11) follows from the fact that x | P i j = x| P i j for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J i , since a cycle does not contain nodes in J. Note that (12) states that at any node k a ∈ K, the sum of the weights of the arcs leaving the node k a is at least the sum of the weights entering this node. Observe that D x can be obtained from D x by appropriately decreasing the weights of every arc entering or leaving the nodes P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m (and deleting the nodes in supp(x) − supp(x )). If k a is not in our cycle for some a ∈ B then the weight of the arcs leaving k a did not decrease (while the weight of those entering k a might have decreased) therefore (12) also holds for x and a. On the other hand, if k a is in the cycle for some a ∈ B, then the weight of exactly one arc leaving k a decreased by and at least one arc entering k a has had its weight decreased by d a . Since d a ≥ 1, this shows that (12) also holds for x and a. Thus indeed x is a solution to (8)-(12).
Since supp(x )
supp(x), by induction on supp(x) there is an acyclic solution x * ≤ x ≤ x, proving the claim. It is also clear that this solution x * can be found in polynomial time.
Corollary 1 The social optimum is always achieved by an acyclic solution.
Proposition 2 An acyclic solution can be decomposed into realized paths.
Proof Suppose that x is a counterexample with |supp(x)| + i |J i | minimal. Consider the digraph D x and choose an arbitrary node j ∈ J i (where i ∈ I) and an arbitrary path P ∈ P i j . A realization (R, F ) of P can be dened the following way: in every step the successors of a node Q should be chosen from supp(x) (equivalently, this could be obtained from a subgraph of D x by a suitable contraction). Since x is feasible, this can be done, and since x is acyclic, this will indeed give a realization of P . Then we dene x P := x P − d (R,F ) (P ) if P ∈ R, and x P := x P if P / ∈ R, and d i j := d i j − , and d e f := d e f for (e, f ) = (i, j). Choose to be maximal such that d and x remain non-negative. We remove j from J i if d i j becomes zero. Then x , d is not a counterexample because of the minimality of x, hence there is a solution y of (13)-(14) with respect to x , d . Consequently, y := y + χ (R,F ) is a solution of (13)-(14) with respect to x, d.
Remark. The proof works with nonlinear functions with the assumption f a (x) ≥ x, too. In this case (12) can be nonlinear, i.e.,
Of course, we need restrictions on the functions f a in order to be able to compute a realization in polynomial time as in Lemma 1.
Remark. The analogue of Corollary 1 for equilibria is not true: it is possible that there are equilibrium solutions but none of them is acyclic.
Remark. In case of d a < 1, simple (and safe) counterexamples to Lemma 1 (in fact, to Claim 1) exist. Such an example was given in Subsection 1.2.
Calculating the social optimum
Our aim is to nd the social optimum: a feasible solution which is optimal for the cost function c. We have seen that this can be written as an LP of polynomial size, so it can be solved in polynomial time. In practice, the running time can be dramatically reduced by the use of suitable solution methods: column generation and Lagrangian relaxation. This section introduces the solution algorithms suited to MMFP.
Column generation
In the following, we describe a column generation method based on the method of Ford and Fulkerson [5] to solve the problem. Let problem (7)-(12) be called the master LP. The column generation method takes a subset of paths, and solves the LP restricted to the variables corresponding to those paths. Then it checks whether the dual solution obtained is feasible for the master LP. If it is, then the primal solution is optimal for the master LP. If it is not, we can nd a variable for which the corresponding dual inequality is violated, and we can add this variable to the restricted LP.
The crucial question is how to nd a dual inequality that is violated, since there are exponentially many inequalities. We show that in our problem it is easy. First we describe the dual problem.
Suppose that we have a dual vector (y * , z * ), and we want to decide if it is feasible, so we have to check inequalities (19) and (20). In order to nd a path P ∈ P i j that violates (19), we have to nd the shortest path from the source to the sink of the commodity j ∈ J i relative to the non-negative length function l a = y * a + c a for a ∈ A i \B i and l a = y * a + d a z i * a + c a for a ∈ B i . If the length of the shortest path is less than z i * j , then we have found a path for which (19) is violated, otherwise there is no such path in P i j .
For P ∈ P ia ka , we have to solve a similar problem with length function l a = y * a + c a for a ∈ A ia \B ia and l a = y * a + d a z ia * a + c a for a ∈ B ia . To sum up, we can test the feasibility of (y * , z * ) by running the Dijkstra algorithm |J| + |K| times.
Lagrangian relaxation
Consider the arc-ow formulation. Let us relax the capacity constraints (2) and assign to them the dual variable vector y ≥ 0. The Lagrangian dual problem is max y≥0 L(y), where L(y) is dened as the optimum of min L(x, y)
x k a ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K i , ∀i ∈ I,
and L(x, y) is the Lagrangian function
Because the Lagrangian dual is the minimum of linear forms in y, it is concave.
Moreover, it is possible to exhibit an element of the anti-subgradient atȳ if we know an optimal solutionx of (21)-(25) atȳ. Indeed, for any y, we have from the denition of L,
Inequality (26) clearly shows that −u+x j +x k is an anti-subgradient. Inequality (26) is sometimes referred to as an optimality cut for L.
The Lagrangian function can be converted into the following form:
Hence, for any y ≥ 0, problem (21)-(25) can be considered as an MMFP on the same D i = (V, A i ), i ∈ I, with costs c a + y a , a ∈ ∪ i∈I A i and without capacity constraints (i.e. u a = +∞, a ∈ ∪ i∈I A i ).
The solution of the MMFP without capacity constraints can be carried out in the following way. It is easy to see that without contractual arcs, problem (21)-(25) is separable into shortest-path problems from the source to the sink of the commodity j in J i relative to the non-negative length function l a = c a + y a for a ∈ A i , i ∈ I. In case of the existence of contractual arcs two kinds of demands have to be considered: the normal and the contractual. However, Lemma 1 says that there are normal realizations behind the contractual arcs. Hence, if we know the minimal cost of a realization of one unit of ow on a contractual arc a ∈ B i (let us denote it by n a ), then problem (21)-(25)
can be considered as shortest-path problems from the source to the sink of the commodity j in J i relative to the non-negative length function l a = c a + y a for a ∈ A i \B i and l a = c a + y a + n a for a ∈ B i , i ∈ I. In order to nd n a for all a ∈ ∪ i∈I B i we apply the following Dynamic programming algorithm to nd the minimal cost of a realization of one unit of ow on a contractual arc
Step 0. Let n a (0) = +∞ for all a ∈ ∪ i∈I B i . Let k = 0.
Step 1. Let n a (k + 1) = min(n a (k), d a l(P a (k))) for all a ∈ ∪ i∈I B i , where l(P a (k)) is the length of the shortest path between the tail and head of a in D ia = (V, A ia ) with arc-lengths l a = c a + y a for a ∈ A ia \B ia and l a = c a + y a + n a (k) for a ∈ B ia .
Step 2. If n a (k + 1) = n a (k) for all a ∈ ∪ i∈I B i then STOP. Else k ← k + 1 GOTO Step 1.
Theorem 1 The algorithm stops within at most i∈I |B i | + 1 iterations.
Proof Corollary of Lemma 1.
By the use of the above method the values as well as the anti-subgardients of the concave function L(y) can be calculated. Hence, several algorithms exist to nd the maximum of it. For example, the the analytic center cutting-plane method (ACCPM) of [7] can be applied.
As a consequence, we can solve MMFP using slight modications of multicommodity ow algorithms based on Lagrangian relaxation. In particular, the algorithm of [2] , which uses partial Lagrangian relaxation with proximal-ACCPM (see [9] ) can be easily converted into an algorithm for MMFP, the only dierence being the computation of L(y), as detailed above.
Results on equilibria
Equilibrium solutions, dened in Subsection 1.2, are solutions where no player has the intention to change the routing in his network. In this section we show that in general it is NP-complete to decide if an equilibrium solution exists, while in safe instances there always exists one. However, even in safe instances the social cost of equilibria can be arbitrarily high, and it is NP-complete to decide if there is one with social cost smaller than C.
Existence of equilibrium solutions
In this subsection we show that an equilibrium solution always exists in a safe instances, even under the very weak assumption that the functions f a are continuous and monotone increasing.
Theorem 2 In a safe instance of the problem there is always an equilibrium solution.
Proof As before, let A be the set of all arcs, B the set of all contractual arcs, and let
i.e. Q is the space of all possible ow values on contractual arcs. Q is a compact convex set in R B . Since contractual demands are determined by the ow values on contractual arcs, we can associate to an element x ∈ Q a set of all (contractual plus normal) demands Dem(x). We dene a set-valued function φ : Q → P(Q) the following way. For x ∈ Q, we consider the demands Dem(x), and take the direct sum of the polyhedra of all minimum cost multicommodity ows (w.r.t. cost function c for normal arcs and c + p for contractual arcs) for each player. Let φ(x) be the projection of this polyhedron to the coordinates corresponding to contractual arcs. In other words, φ(x) contains all vectors on B that arise as arc values of minimum cost multicommodity ows for demands Dem(x).
It is clear that φ(x) is closed and convex for every x, since it is a polyhedron. We show that φ is upper semi-continuous, i.e. its graph is closed. Let x i ∈ Q (i ∈ N) be a convergent sequence, x i → x ∈ Q. Let furthermore y i ∈ φ(x i ) (i ∈ N) such that y i → y ∈ Q. For y i , let y i ∈ R A be a minimum cost multicommodity ow for demands Dem(x i ) whose restriction to B is y i . By the standard argument, we can select a subsequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . so that y ij (a) is convergent for every a ∈ A. Let y denote the limit. Since the functions f a (a ∈ B) are continuous and the multicommodity ow problem is linear, y is a minimum cost multicommodity ow for demands Dem(x). This proves that y ∈ φ(x).
By Kakutani's xed point theorem [8] , there is an element x * ∈ Q such that x * ∈ φ(x * ). This means that for demands Dem(x * ), there are minimum cost multicommodity ows for each player with contractual arc values equal to x * . This corresponds to an equilibrium solution.
NP-completeness
Let us dene an auxiliary directed graph D * = (I, A * ) on the set of players. There is an arc from i to i a for each contractual arc a ∈ B. We allow parallel arcs, so |A * | = |B|. We say that the contracts are acyclic if D * is acyclic.
We know that in a safe instance there is always an equilibrium solution.
In contrast, the following result shows that for non-safe instances it is hard to decide if there is an equilibrium. Theorem 3 In general it is NP-compete to decide whether there is an equilibrium solution. This holds even if the contracts are acyclic and the instance is almost safe in the sense that there is only one contractual demand that cannot be routed.
Proof We reduce SAT to this problem. Suppose there are m clauses and n variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . We construct an instance with n + 2 players: the rst n players correspond to variables, the network of the (n + 1)-th player models the clauses, and the (n + 2)-th player is a dummy player with no arcs in his network. We show that the instance has an equilibrium solution if and only if the SAT instance is satisable.
The j-th player (j = 1, . . . , n) has a normal demand of one unit from u j to v j and his network contains two disjoint paths from u j to v j , one corresponding to x j , the other to x j . These paths contain several contractual arcs: one for each clause in which x j (resp. x j ) appears. The contractor for these arcs is the (n + 1)-th player. All costs are 0 and all capacities are 1.
The (n + 1)-th player has m normal demands of one unit, one for each clause. The i-th demand is from s i to t i , and there is a normal arc from s i to t i with high cost and unit capacity. In addition, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} there is a path from s i to t i with cost 0 and unit capacity, and these paths share a single arc st (but apart from the nodes s and t they are node-disjoint). The arc st is a contractual arc with the (n + 2)-th player, who has no s − t path in his network, so this contract cannot be realized.
All the contractual demands of the (n + 1)-th player lie on these paths: for all literals in clause i, the contractual demands corresponding to the literals cover disjoint sections of the path (not containing st).
In an equilibrium solution, the (n + 1)-th player must route his normal demands on the high-cost s i − t i arcs, because the low-cost paths contain an unrealizable contract. By the denition of equilibrium, he must have a minimum cost multicommodity ow in his network, which means that all the low cost paths must contain an arc saturated by the ow corresponding to a contractual demand, i.e. there must be a contractual demand of value 1 on each low cost path. This means that the ows of the rst n players must be paths that correspond to an evaluation that satises every clause.
To see the other direction, consider an evaluation that satises every clause.
This denes an equilibrium solution the following way. The j-th player (j = 1, . . . , n) routes his normal demand on the path corresponding to x j if x j is true in the evaluation, and on the path corresponding to x j if it is false. The (n+1)-th player routes his normal demands on the high-cost s i −t i arcs. It can be seen by the same argument as above that this is an equilibrium solution.
Remark. A similar proof shows that in a safe instance it is NP-complete to decide if there is an equilibrium solution with social cost smaller than C, even if the contracts are acyclic. The only modication is that the high cost in the construction above should be small compared to C, and a normal arc st of cost C and capacity m should be added to the network of the (n + 2)-th player.
